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Abstract
The environment is traditionally considered as a valence issue where
all political parties endorse the same position and differ only on the
degree to which they emphasize it. Our paper challenges this view by
arguing that the environment is increasingly perceived as a positional
issue. We examine cross-country mass survey data and demonstrate
that many voters perceive a trade-off between environmental protec-
tion and economic growth. This perception is increasingly reflected
in the discourse of political parties. In particular, expert surveys and
party manifesto data indicate the existence of anti-environmental po-
sitions among radical right/nationalist parties, a finding which chal-
lenges the view that the environment is a distinctively left-wing is-
sue. By qualitatively analyzing the most recent national and Euro-
pean election manifestos of thirteen radical right parties in Western
Europe we demonstrate the ways in which these parties frame their
anti-environmental positions and conclude that analyses of voting be-
haviour should take into account the positional nature of the issues
associated with environmental protection.
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1 Introduction
Concern for the environment entered strongly the political agenda in the
late 1960s and early 1970s and has since become one of the core issue of
what has been labelled as the ‘new politics’ dimension of political ideology.
Early on, and while making their contribution to the alignment-dealignment
debate, Flanagan & Dalton (1984) argued that in Western Europe some of the
‘new issues’ associated with the environment, most notably environmental
pollution, can be considered to be valence issues. The term valence appeared
in political science for the first time in Stokes’ (1963) seminal critique of
the Downsian spatial framework (Downs 1957). Stokes developed the term
‘valence’ to define consensus issues, in other words issues on which the whole
electorate is in agreement on the desired outcome and all political parties have
one clear ideological position. Subsequently party competition is structured
around performance. Political parties argue that they can tackle these issues
in a more effective manner and citizens vote based on their (retrospective
or prospective) evaluations about the parties’ performance. In this sense,
valence issues are contrasted to ‘position’ issues which involve advocacy of
government actions from a set of alternatives or which involve trade-offs
between two highly desirable but mutually exclusive outcomes (Heath, Jowell
& Curtice 1985). These alternatives structure a continuum that captures
the distribution of voter preferences on the issue (Stokes 1963, 373) while
parties can be ‘for’ or ‘against’ the issue in question along this continuum
(Budge 2001a, 83).
Economic prosperity/growth, lower crime, national security, high-quality
health care and education, and a clean environment are issues which have
been consistently used as core examples of valence issues (Clarke et al. 2011,
Green 2007, van der Brug 2004). As Jordan & Rayner (2010, 71) put it,
‘the environment has always been a valence issue. Who, after all, can be
possibly against “a better environment”?’ Studies of West European politics
(Rohrschneider 1988) as well as American politics (Jacoby 1994) contest to
this categorization. In effect, considering the environment as a valence is-
sue implies a large degree of consensus among the electorate. In this respect
Dunlap (1995, 107) has argued that even though there is no clear large active
pro-environment bloc, environmental protection has the large support of the
majority of the electorate, making this into a valence issue. Along the same
lines, Mertig & Dunlap (1995) concluded that environmental protection has
reached the valence status, as it elicits little public opposition and predicted
that environmentalism would remain a vital component of Western political
systems for the foreseeable future. It is often therefore typically assumed that
environmental protection, like other valence issues typically obtain support
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from the majority of respondents in virtually all countries within the sample
(Harrison & McIntosh 2007) and in several studies of voting behaviour the
argument has been that most people agree on the desired policy outcome
regarding environmental concerns (Aardal 1990, Johns, Mitchell, Denver &
Pattie 2009). Consequently, projects aiming to estimate the policy positions
of political parties such as the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) typi-
cally assume that parties differ with respect to environmental protection only
in the degree to which they emphasize the issue.
In this paper we challenge the view of the environment as a valence is-
sue. We begin by challenging the assumption of consensus among the elec-
torate. Using evidence from the European Social Survey (European Social
Survey 2002) we examine the dimensionality of the issue of environmen-
tal protection among voters and conclude that the degree of consensus is
largely contingent on how questions in mass surveys are asked. The con-
sensus on which the valence view of the environment is based could be an
artefact of the question wording, while alternative operationalizations re-
veal that the percentage of European electorates with anti-environmental
attitudes is non-trivial. Recognizing the existence of anti-environmental at-
titudes among European electorates, we switch to examining the positions of
political parties. We show that, when scaled properly, different data sources
point out that many political parties have positions which are practically
anti-environmental. Moreover, the comparison of different sources shows
that these anti-environmental positions are largely concentrated among par-
ties that have been labelled as ‘radical’, ‘populist’ or ‘extreme’ right. To gain
a better understanding of these anti-environmental positions, we analyze the
content of national and European election manifestos of thirteen such parties
in Western Europe. We find that radical right parties have largely incorpo-
rated anti-environmentalism within the main ideological tenets of their party
family. Our paper concludes that such polarization of attitudes and positions
effectively negates the treatment of the environment as a valence issue and
suggest that it should not be operationalized as such in studies seeking to
explain voting behaviour.
2 Anti-environmental attitudes among West
European electorates
As argued above, in many studies, the environment has been used as a va-
lence issue without necessarily performing in-depth investigations regarding
its dimensionality and the levels of consensus across different electorates and
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party systems. Nevertheless, recent research has challenged the notion that
valence issues automatically imply a high degree of consensus. As Pardos-
Prado (2012, 10) argues, the link between valence and consensus might be
based on disputable theoretical assumptions, while he effectively showed that
the ‘aggregate effect of party competence perceptions is positively correlated
with party ideological polarization, voter ideological polarization, and the
strength of spatial voting.’ In effect this brings us back to an examination of
what valence issues really entail.
Political issues have both positional and valence aspects. Traditional spa-
tial issues that divide the public also need a valence component to demon-
strate which party is capable enough to deal with the issue, regardless of
position. Similarly traditional valence issues, such as economic prosperity
have a positional edge related to the path a party can take to achieve the
commonly desired goal. Therefore an issue can be framed one way or the
other depending on the context and issues can fluctuate between position
and valence. Issues can have a life cycle during which they can polarise
public opinion and party ideology or they can build a consensus around a
commonly desired goal. As a consequence, issues that attract high levels
of consensus can be considered as valence issues. Valence issues have two
important characteristics: public opinion on them is converged on one ideal
point and subsequently party competition is structured around performance.
To achieve the commonly desired outcome the mentioned issues required
very complex policy making. Opinion convergence allows the voters to avoid
stressing on the details of these policies and to focus on performance when
deciding which party to vote for.
This cognitive sequence poses a problem in the use of the term ‘valence’.
Many scholars treat as valence issues those issues related to measuring of per-
formance of leader and parties and forget about the first step of establishing
whether an issue inspires opinion consensus and thus can be legitimately pass
to the next level of cognition, performance. Nobody can be against ‘a better
environment’ in absolute terms but in politics nothing is presented as an
absolute value. When environmental protection is presented as an obstacle
for economic growth or as an interference with the country’s sovereignty it
leads to interesting ideological debates. To achieve the commonly desired
outcome of ‘clean environment’ very complex policy making is required. Ex-
treme opinion convergence allows the voters to avoid stressing on the details
of these policies and to focus on performance when deciding which party to
vote for. This cognitive sequence, however, implies that the degree on which
an issue can be considered to be a ‘valence’ issue depends on the way the
issue is framed: as a yes/no issue or as a trade-off. Framing the environment
as a yes/no issue leads to general agreement on it, but it also minimizes the
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public debate on it. The moment its salience increases, however, a new de-
bate starts on how to implement policies leading to a ‘clean environment’.
These policies immediately introduce trade-offs that do not allow the issue
to remain a straight valence issue.
More specifically, we can agree that there are various ways in which we
can go about and protect the environment but some are more costly than
others. Do people agree on road taxing or green taxes in general? How
about nuclear power? Should we assume that everybody agrees that it is
environmentally dangerous and should be abolished as soon as possible? By
thinking about the environment in these terms we can easily come to the
conclusion that even though there is an apparent agreement on the goal of
‘clean environment’ there seems to be no agreement about the specific course
of action. This, of course, leaves open the possibility for a considerable part
of the electorate to voice preferences on policies that are effectively anti-
environmental.
Past research on support for environmental protection indicated that the
degree of consensus largely depends on how survey questions are framed.
For instance, questions asking whether the environment is an urgent prob-
lem produced largely overwhelming majorities of affirmative responses in the
1990/91 World Values survey. A similar pattern emerges from the 2002 Eu-
ropean Social Survey data. Figure 1 shows a ‘violin’ plot of citizens’ median
placement and distribution over a six point ordinal scale on the whether
it is important to care about nature and the environment among 15 West
European countries.1 The figure shows that, in each of these countries, an
overwhelming majority of citizens agree that it is important for them to care
about the environment.
As Dalton (2002, 110) noted, however, ‘popular views can be expressed in
a survey without concern for the actual costs of a policy’. In this respect ques-
tions tapping environmental support can be framed in terms of associated
costs. It is quite telling therefore that when citizens were asked whether they
would be willing to pay higher taxes to prevent environmental pollution, the
overwhelming majorities in many countries evaporated (Inglehart 1995, 60).
More curiously, when the question was phrased negatively asking whether
respondents agreed that the government has to reduce environmental pollu-
tion but it should not cost them any money (Inglehart 1995, 60), the over-
whelming majorities were transformed to overwhelming minorities in most
of the countries. The 2002 European Social Survey has not included such a
1The question described a person for whom ‘looking after the environment is important
to him/her’ and asked respondents to state whether this person is like them on a scale
ranging from ‘very much like me’ (1) to ‘not like me at all’ (6).
5
1
2
3
4
5
6
Im
po
rta
nt
 to
 c
ar
e 
fo
r n
at
ur
e 
an
d 
en
vir
on
m
en
t
AT BE CH DE DK ES FI FR GB GR IE NL NO PT SE
Figure 1: Distribution and median response regarding the importance of
caring about the environment (2002 European Social Survey).
question, but an alternatively framed question suggested that environmental
protection could imply opposition to economic growth. The conflict between
economic growth and environmental protection reflects differences between
materialist and post-materialist values and ‘the clash over alternative values
creates a basis for political competition’ (Dalton 2002, 77). The argument
goes that we cannot demand a clean environment and support industrial
growth, as we cannot demand lower taxes and an increase in public spending
at the same time. In a sense, doing so would be equivalent to eating the cake
and having it. Figure 2 shows the median response and distribution over
a 5-point ordinal scale where 5 indicates strong agreement that economic
growth always ends up harming the environment.
As seen in Figure 2, the distribution of responses is radically different
compared to the question about the importance of caring about the environ-
ment. In six out of 15 countries, median response is at the anti-environmental
side of the scale. In these countries respondents felt that economic growth
does not really harm the environment which is at odds with ecological think-
ing about environmental protection. As Dryzek (1997, 46–49) showed, the
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Figure 2: Distribution and median response regarding the trade-off between
growth and the environment (2002 European Social Survey).
belief that economic growth can continue unabated without environmental
damage is rooted in evidence regarding the falling price of natural resources.
Of course the price of natural resources falls not because they become more
abundant but because modern technology allows using them in a more effi-
cient way. For instance, natural resources were able to meet the rising global
needs for energy by switching from wood to coal, then oil and natural gas,
then to nuclear fission and finally nuclear fusion. This implies that respon-
dents feel that nuclear energy is safe and non-polluting which in turn reflects
trust that science can address environmental issues effectively without nec-
essarily reducing the current growth rates. This in turn implies that the
belief that scientific progress can allow perpetual growth without harming
the environment, can tap anti-environmental attitudes.
The European Social Survey explicitly connects science with environ-
mental attitudes by asking whether science can solve environmental prob-
lems. The distribution and median response for this question can be found
in Figure 3. The figure presents a pattern which is largely similar to Fig-
ure 2 implying that there is a substantive number of respondents who have
7
1
2
3
4
5
M
od
er
n 
sc
ie
nc
e 
ca
n 
so
lve
 o
ur
 e
nv
iro
nm
en
ta
l p
ro
bl
em
s
AT BE CH DE DK ES FI FR GB GR IE IT LU NL NO PT SE
Figure 3: Distribution and median response regarding trust that science can
solve environmental problems (2002 European Social Survey).
attitudes that are practically anti-environmental. Nevertheless, although re-
sponses to this question have been used as a proxy for anti-environmentalism
to explain support for radical right parties (see Ivarsflaten 2008), others con-
tend that the double-barreled nature of the question make it an ineffective
measure as negative responses might not measure environmentalism but in-
stead measure distrust to science (Dolezal 2010, 548). Polychoric correlations
between the questions in Figures 2 and 3 within each country proved to be
very weak (< .1).2 This implies that the citizens that appear to have anti-
environmental attitudes using one question are not the same that appear to
have anti-environmental attitudes using another question. This points to the
problem already discussed above, namely that the degree of commitment to
environmental protection among European publics cannot be easily tapped
through mass survey and the distribution of responses depends largely on the
framing of the question. The evidence presented here, however, also point
2Judging from the standard errors, the polychoric correlations were also found to be
statistically insignificant, with the exception of Greece and Ireland. In both countries,
however, the coefficients were also extremely weak at < .2.
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that the supposed overwhelming consensus in favour of environmental pro-
tection might in fact be an artefact of the question format. When alternative
questions are used, non-trivial portions of the European electorates appear
to have attitudes which are practically anti-environmental.
3 Anti-environmental positions among West
European parties
The previous question challenged the fact that the environment can be con-
sidered as a valence issue among West European electorates. This leads us
to the next question. If indeed considerable parts of the West European elec-
torates harbour anti-environmental attitudes, would not it be rational for po-
litical parties to mobilize on an anti-environmental agenda? In our individual
level findings in was clear that, if framed in absolut terms, very few people are
against ‘a better environment’. On this basis, and following the proponents
of valence models of political behaviour, Budge (2001b, 212–213) has argued
that, for valence issues, ‘only one position can be adopted by parties with-
out committing electoral suicide’. Conversely, analyses of the environmental
issue in party competitions have stressed that, although campaigning explic-
itly on an anti-environmental agenda (like the Swiss Motorists’ Party did in
the 1980s) is quite rare, there is evidence that ‘mainstream’ parties often
take positions which are practically anti-environmental (Mair 2001, 104) and
that positioning on secondary issues such as the environment provides strong
electoral incentives (List & Sturm 2006). This is in line with our findings
that, when the environment is framed as a trade-off, then anti-environmental
positions are detected among the electorates. Thus framing for parties and
voters goes hand-in-hand. These findings can be supplemented by additional
evidence from the US raging from historical accounts such as Richard Nixon’s
strong anti-environmental record in office (Turner 2009), to content analysis
of environmental scepticism books suggesting the making of a conservative
anti-environmental counter-movement (Jacques, Dunlap & Freeman 2008).
Regardless these evidence, the most popular data source for the policy po-
sitions of political parties has traditionally considered valence issues such as
the environment the CMP allowed for coding only positive pro-environmental
references. The CMP has performed content analysis on thousands of docu-
ments on the premise that political parties confront each other not by taking
opposing positions but by emphasizing different policy issues, although some
of the categories in the CMP coding scheme allowed for coding to be per-
formed within a positional (pro/against) framework (for a critical view see
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Laver 2001). More specifically, the CMP coding scheme includes two rele-
vant categories (Volkens 2002, 33), ‘501: Environmental protection’ which
includes all favourable references to:
‘preservation of countryside, forests, etc.; general preservation of
natural resources against selfish interests; proper use of national
parks; soil banks, etc; environmental improvement,’
and ‘416: Anti-growth economy’ which includes
‘Favourable mentions of anti-growth politics and steady state
economy; sustainable development.’
The inclusion of the ‘Anti-growth economy’ category was necessitated by the
increasing salience of environmental issues and the nuanced character of envi-
ronmental politics after the emergence of Green parties since the late 1970s.
Despite the fact that the CMP argued that it did not make sense for political
parties to adopt anti-environmental positions, many researchers felt that the
degree in which parties are committed to environmental protection oughts to
be operationalized as a trade-off between environmental protection and eco-
nomic growth (Carter 2006, Laver & Hunt 1992). The classic approach has
therefore been to calculate the sum of categories 416 and 501 and subtract
the references to category ‘410: Productivity’, defined as the
‘need to encourage or facilitate greater production; need to take
measures to aid this; appeal for greater production and impor-
tance of productivity to the economy; the paradigm of growth.’
Weale et al. (2000, 427) were the first to adopt this approach, followed by
Lowe et al. (2011) who argued for a slightly different scale which applies a
logarithmic transformation to the issue categories in order to eliminate the
effect of categories with zero frequency and reflect the decreasing marginal
effect of every additional reference that is coded in any category.
Similarly, expert surveys have traditionally accounted for the presence
of anti-environmental positions by asking experts to place parties on scales
juxtaposing environmental protection to economic growth (Benoit & Laver
2006, Laver & Hunt 1992). An alternative approach to estimating parties’
policy positions focuses on the constructing Likert scales by combining par-
ties’ positions on specific issues (Gemenis & Dinas 2010, Pellikaan, van der
Meer & de Lange 2003). The idea behind this approach is that party compe-
tition is structured around a specific set of issues. Consequently, determining
the position of any party on any policy dimension becomes a matter of es-
timating the position of the party on a set of issues that are representative
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of this policy dimension (Gemenis 2012a). This effectively recognizes that
parties can take pro or contra positions on issues relating to the environ-
ment and effectively enables researchers to construct scales which run from
an pro-environmental to anti-environmental positions.
This latter approach is followed by many voting advice applications in-
cluding the EU Profiler, a project which provides data from the positions of
some 274 parties on 28 issue items for the 2009 elections to the European
Parliament. Three out of the 28 items included in the EU Profiler refer to
the environment. Item 16 asks whether ‘renewable sources of energy (e.g.
solar or wind energy) should be supported even if this means higher energy
costs’, item 17 whether ‘the promotion of public transport should be fostered
through green taxes (e.g. road taxing)’, and item 18 whether ‘policies to fight
global warming should be encouraged even if it hampers economic growth or
employment’. Party responses on these items were coded on 5-point scales
raging from completely agree to completely disagree by a group of country
experts using, among others, evidence from party manifestos and responses
from questionnaires sent to party headquarters (Trechsel & Mair 2011). Al-
though some aspects of the EU Profiler approach are somewhat question-
able in methodological terms, the EU Profiler data allow researchers to pro-
duce valid representations of parties’ positions on several policy dimensions
(Gemenis 2012a). Items 16, 17 and 18 can be combined in a reliable scale,
judging from the monotone relationship between each of the items and a scale
comprision of the remaining two as shown in Figure 4 (see also Gemenis &
Dinas 2010, Gemenis 2012a).
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Figure 4: Examining the scalability of the items in the environmental scale
(2009 EU Profiler data, loess curve with α = .7, points jittered 5%).
So do parties adopt anti-environmental positions? Figure 5 presents a his-
togram with the distribution of party scores on the environment scale based
on the EU Profiler data as explained above, where higher values indicate
11
anti-environmental positions. It becomes clear that, although most parties
take position in favour of environmental protection (in favour of renewable
sources of energy and green taxes, and against economic growth), there is a
non trivial number of parties adopting positions which are effectively anti-
environmental. Moreover, the comparison of the EU Profiler data to other
sources, such as expert surveys and the content analysis of party manifestos
shows that this finding is not an artefact of the estimation method. In each
of the three scatterplots in Figure 6, where we compare the EU Profiler
estimates to expert and manifesto estimates, there is a non-trivial concentra-
tion of parties near the top right corners which indicate anti-environmental
positions.3
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Figure 5: The distribution of party scores on the environmental/anti-
environmental EU Profiler scale.
To be sure, different methods of estimating parties’ policy positions mea-
sure different aspects of party ideology and they are likely to come up with
different results (Dinas & Gemenis 2010, Volkens 2007). Moreover, different
sources may display different results due to differences in measurement error
of a non-random nature (Curini 2010, Gemenis 2012b). This is also true for
the methods compared in Figure 6. Experts tend not to assign purely anti-
environmental positions to parties as evident from the scatterplot on the left
where the expert survey scale is censored at about .8. According to the ex-
perts, there seem to be no parties that totally advocate economic growth over
3To match parties’ positions from different methods all scales were normalized in order
to run from zero to one. For the CMP data, we only used estimates based on documents
published between 2006 and 2010.
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environmental protection, although there are some parties that score quite
high in favour of economic growth. Conversely, the scaled data from the CMP
shows that there are some parties which emphasize economic growth without
making references to environmental protection in their manifestos. The man-
ifesto based scales, however, show that most parties emphasize both economic
growth and environmental protection while it is not possible to evaluate par-
ties’ exact positions on these issues by using the CMP data. This is where the
EU Profiler data comes handy because it estimates parties’ positions not in-
directly (through the relative emphasis to different policy areas) but directly
through the positions on specific environment-related issues. Nethertheless,
the EU Profiler may still underestimate the degree of anti-environmentalism
because the scales do not include parties’ positions on the issue of nuclear
energy which is likely to be viewed positively by many parties.
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Figure 6: Comparing parties’ positions on environmental/anti-environmental
scales.
In any case, however, the comparison of different methods in measur-
ing parties’ positions regarding the environment shows a consistent pattern:
the parties that appear closer to the top right quartile of the scatterplots are
right-wing parties, most of them belonging to the family which has been char-
acterized as extreme, radical or populist right (hereafter radical right). This
pattern fits prior theoretical expectations about the radical right parties. Ac-
cording to Ignazi (1992) the emergence of the radical right can be linked to a
‘counter-revolution’ to the values brought to the political agenda by the green
parties in the 1970s, such as multiculturalism and support for environmen-
tal protection. Consequently some have the attitudinal basis for supporting
radical right parties is the mirror image of the attitudinal basis for support-
ing green parties. If multiculturalism and environmentalism distinguishes
the green left, it is anti-immigrant attitudes and anti-environmentalism that
distinguishes the radical right (Ivarsflaten 2008). In the following section
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we investigate the degree to which radical right parties in Europe take anti-
environmental positions and show how these positions are framed within
their ideological discourse. Seeing that quantitative analyses of party mani-
festos might be ‘missing the tree’ when searching for the forest, we employ a
qualitative reading of the manifestos of 13 European parties which have been
considered to belong in what is known as the radical right party family.
4 How radical right parties frame their anti-
environmental discourse
In this section we explore radical right party stance on the environment and
assess the ways in which they frame it. Our sample comprises of thirteen
parties from twelve European countries. These include the Austrian Freedom
Party (FPO¨), the Belgian Flemish Interest (VB), the Danish People’s Party
(DF), the True Finns (TF), the French Front National (FN), the German
Die Republikaner (REP) and the National Democratic Party of Germany
(NPD), the Greek Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS), the Italian Northern
League (NL), the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV), the Swiss People’s Party
(SVP), the British National Party (BNP) and the Swedish Democrats (SD).
Although the radical right party family has been generally contested, there is
broad consensus in the literature that the above parties belong to this family
(see among others Art 2011, Arzheimer & Carter 2009, Ennser 2012, Mudde
2007). The main common characteristics of the above parties are their strong
and mostly ethnically based nationalism, high levels of authoritarianism and
a populist rhetoric (Mudde 2007).
We qualitatively analyze recent party national manifestos and the 2009
European election manifestos in order to complement the methods employed
above and provide in-depth support for our findings, i.e. that radical right
parties tend to be the ones that offer a clear anti-environmental message to
the electorate.4 In order to systematize our cross-country analysis, we have
a priori operationalized the environmental issue by focusing on some of its
most prominent issue components, namely pollution, nuclear energy, qual-
ity of life, global warming, genetically modified crops and green taxes. In
reading through the manifestos, we are interested in each party’s mentions
of each individual issue component. We first identify the relevant statements
related to each component and assess whether the party’s position is on the
4Details for the manifestos can be found in the Appendix. Quotes were translated by
the authors and page numbers are given whenever available (some of the manifestos are
only available unpaginated in electronic format).
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environmental or anti-environmental side. We then proceed by distinguising
how each party frames the environment. The frames, as will be shown below,
vary from typical radical right focusing on ‘strict law and order’ and ‘immi-
gration’ to the trade-off between economic development and growth vis-a-vis
environmental protection.
All the parties under investigation that mention the ‘pollution’ component
agree that their country should should be clean and free of any type of
pollution. Interestingly, the Swiss SVP engages in blame-shifting arguments
presenting socialism as the cause of all pollution (SVP 2011). More than half
of the radical right parties argue that nuclear energy is needed to generate
heat and electricity. They identify that renewable sources including solar,
tidal, water and wind provide limited resources and as such European states
will be unable to meet their power needs. The Austrian FPO¨ prefers to
focus on renewable energy sources as do the German REP and NPD and
the Danish DF. Quality of life is a theme that does not appear as much in
the parties’ manifestos possibly indicating its low salience relatively to the
energy issue. The parties that do mention it, however, tend to link it with a
traditional way of life (FN 2007), the ways in which people connect to their
land (NPD 2005) and the link between quality of life and the preservation of
national cultural heritage (LAOS 2007). The Danish DF (2009) argues that
the environment is associated with qualitative growth and quality of life.
Apart from the Greek LAOS that positively acknowledges the challenge of
global warming, party positions on this issue are clearly anti-environmental.
The most anti-environmental party is the BNP (2010, 26) which argues that
it is ‘the only party to oppose the global warming theory’. The Danish DF
(2009) recognizes its existence but, similarly to the Italian LN (2009, 41), it
views the human factor with scepticism. Similarly, the Belgian VB (2012,
13) argues that ‘we should not view global warming in fatalistic terms’.
Six out of the thirteen parties discuss the issue of genetically modified
crops, again indicating that for more that half the parties this issue is not
salient. FPO¨ (2006, 2008, 2009), DF (2009), TF (2011), BNP (2005, 2010)
and NPD (2009) are explicitly against this type of crops. The French FN
provides a less coherent argument on the one hand mentioning that it is in
favour of genetically modified food so long as the consumer remains informed
(FN 2007, 46), but on the other hand it opposes international agreements
permitting their import if they do not respect the French norms (FN 2009,
3).
Lastly, only the Greek LAOS and the Italian LN do not mention green
taxes in their electoral manifestos. The remaining eleven parties are all over-
whelmingly against environmental taxes. The Danish DF (2009) argues that
‘environmental taxes should not become just a new way to finance govern-
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ment consumption’. Parties tend to agree that taxes have a negative effect on
the development of the economy (REP 2002), that taxes would make energy
more expensive (SVP 2011), that green taxes are disguised tax increases (VB
2012, 13), that pensioners and people from low incomes would have to pay
(DF 2009) and that we should not financially ‘punish’ individuals (SD 2011,
27). The Finnish TF (2011, 67) even argues that we need to make driving
cheaper. The Austrian FPO¨ (2006) is somewhat inconsistent. On the one
hand, it supports taxing big cars but on the other it argues that VAT on
energy must be cut in half. The Swedish SD (2011, 26) is the only party that
accept taxes as incentives for environmental actions.
Table 1: Radical right party positions on key environment-related issues.
Disagree Inconclusive Agree
Nuclear energy DF, FPO¨, NPD,
LAOS
REP BNP, FN, LN,
PVV, SD, SVP,
TF, VB
GM crops BNP, DF, FPO¨,
NPD, TF
FN -
Green taxes BNP, DF, FN,
NPD, PVV, TF,
REP, SVP, VB
FPO¨ SD
Global warming
is man-made
BNP, DF, LN,
VB
NPD, SD LAOS
Table 1 summarizes some of the results from our qualitative reading of the
manifestos. The table presents only parties’ positions in issue areas where
taking a position makes sense (e.g. one cannot be in favour of pollution,
but can be sceptical whether global warming is man made). As evident
from the table, with the exception of the issue of GM crops, parties of the
radical right party family tilt overwhelmingly to the anti-environmental side
of position taking. The way the parties ‘frame’ the environmental issue is
largely similar. We have identified a number of common themes on the basis
of which radical right actors justify their anti-environmental positions. These
include law and order, immigration, nationalism and anti-European frames.
The use of technology as a means to resolve environmental problems is an
occurring theme amongst some parties. The majority of parties acknowledge
the existence of a trade-off between economic development and environmental
protection.
The French FN (2007, 46) frames the environmental issue in terms of law
and order arguing that ‘we should strengthen measures and criminal sanc-
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tions to prevent pollution in areas such as oil spills, forest fires, illegal dumps,
vandalism etc’. Similarly, the German NPD (2002) argues that ‘nature crim-
inals should pay’ and the Dutch PVV (2010, 45) that ‘we should combat pol-
luters’. The Italian LN (2009, 45) argues that local administrators of waste
management should be penalized if they have not been responsible enough
but also rewarded if they have been. The BNP (2010, 25) calls for a ‘pol-
luter pays principle’ to be adopted and the creation of Environmental Courts
that would ‘investigate and prosecute fly-tippers, bush meat importers and
commercial and industrial polluters’. The Swedish SD (2011, 27) argues that
‘companies that earn money on environmentally destructive production may
need to compensate for the damaged caused’.
Four parties associate the environment with immigration. This is not
as surprising given that for these parties ‘immigration control serves as a
matrix—or a funnel—through which many other policies run’ (Hainsworth
2008, 70). The BNP (2010, 24) views pollution as the result of mass im-
migration. It portrays itself at the ‘only true “Green Party” in Britain as
only the BNP intends to end mass immigration into Britain and thereby re-
move at a stroke the need for an extra 4 million homes in the green belts
of the South East and elsewhere’ (BNP 2005, 48). The Finnish TF (2011,
43) argues that migration flows will destroy ‘our’ environment whereas the
French FN (2007, 45) warns that ‘ecology should not become a pretext for
a lenient immigration policy’. The Greek LAOS (2007, 43) makes a tenuous
link between immigration and sustainable development interestingly linking
this argument to a European council decision providing legal substance for
this position.
The theme of energy independence and self-sustainability is one that con-
sistently occurs in the parties’ manifestos. The Austrian FPO¨ (2006, 2008,
2009, 2011) argues that Austria can achieve energy independence through
nuclear power and renewable sources. The Belgian VB (2012, 13) does not
view nationalism and environmental concerns as contradictory. The BNP
(2005), the Belgian VB (2009, 44) and the Dutch PVV (2010, 45) argue that
their respective countries should obtain energy independence from Russia
and the Arab states. The Swedish SD (2011) also prefers self-sufficiency.
The Swiss SVP (2011) presents energy policy as embedded within national
security. The Danish DF (2009) argues for national determination in food
safety, whereas the French FN (2007, 45) presents the environmental richness
of the country as fundamental for French quality of life and national identity.
These nationalist frames are also linked with a general anti-EU and anti-
foreign investment feeling. The Dutch PVV (2010, 53) urges that Brussels
stops deciding ‘what our fishermen are allowed to do’ while the Finnish TF
(2011, 63) similarly argues that Brussels should not regulate the hunting of
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wolves and other ‘pests’. The Italian LN (2009, 43) finds the EU too harsh
whereas the French FN (2007, 46) does not accept a global eco-government.
Crucially, the parties under investigation acknowledge a clear trade-off
between environmental protection and economic development. DF (2009)
argues that environmental policy should take the economy into consider-
ation. The Dutch PVV (2010, 51) actually urges to stimulate growth in
Schiphol by reducing environmental regulation, and the Finnish TF (2011,
67) explicitly mentions that ‘we should not protect moose at the expense of
the wood industry’. French FN (2007, 47) warns that the reduction of energy
consumption should not result in lower standards of living. For REP (2002)
economic development comes first, whereas the Italian LN (2008) aspires to
find a ‘balance’ between the two. Swiss SVP (2011) argues that laws on en-
vironmental protection increase costs and bureaucracy, which impacts on the
economy. Only the Greek LAOS (2007, 80) does not view environment and
growth as necessarily antithetical given that Greece has sources of renewable
energy, and the Austrian FPO¨ (2008) views renewable energy resources as a
way to increase employment.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we challenged the notion that the environment can be consid-
ered to be a valence issue implying that there is an overwhelming consensus
regarding the desired policy outcome and that party competition is struc-
tured around performance. Building on previous arguments that challenged
the direct link between valence and consensus (Pardos-Prado 2012), our anal-
ysis of cross-national survey data showed that the, too often assumed, con-
sensus might be an artefact of the survey question framing. When questions
are framed as policy trade-offs, West European electorates appear to be less
pro-environmental than previously assumed.
Turning to political parties, our paper challenged the long held notion
that it is impossible or counter-intuitive for parties to take anti-environmental
positions. We showed that when the concept of environmentalism is opera-
tionalized appropriately (Dryzek 1997) and the data are scaled accordingly,
some parties appear to take positions which are practically anti-environmental.
In agreement with previous research (Ennser 2012, 161–162), we argued that
anti-environmentalism is most prominent among parties in the radical right
party family which shows a remarkable cohesion on the issue. Moreover,
our qualitative analysis of the manifestos of 13 such parties revealed that
their discourse regarding the environment does not constitute an alternative
view of environmentalism, as has been previously argued (Olsen 1999), but
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is framed within some of the classic ideological components of the radical
right: opposition to immigration, nationalism, welfare chauvinism and Eu-
roscepticism. Radical right anti-environmentalism can be understood as a
materialist reaction against left-wing/green post-materialism (Ignazi 1992),
as ‘the new coalition of forces which see their common enemy in the post
materialist New Left and its political agenda’ (Minkenberg 1995, 224).
These challenging findings, when taken together point that taking anti-
environmental positions should not necessarily lead to electoral suicide as
previously assumed Budge (2001b, 212–213). In fact, the electoral perfor-
mance of the thirteen parties which have been shown to in our quantitative
and qualitative analyses is quite impressive. In the 2009 elections to the
European Parliament, 12 out of the 13 parties won between 1.3 and 17% of
the vote, securing alltogether 27 out of the 736 seats, while the Swiss SVP
earned 26.6% in the latest (2011) federal election. Radical right parties are
becoming increasingly successful in the European political landscape and it
seems that their anti-environmentalism contributes to the electoral choice
for the radical right (Ivarsflaten 2008). Even though many of them may
not have the capacity to directly influence policy (through coalition govern-
ments) given their ideological extremism, they do seem, however, to have
the ability to change the dynamics of domestic competition by increasing
the salience of the issues they focus on (Mudde 2007). For these reasons
we suggest that future analyses of voting behaviour should reconsider the
nature of party competition over the environment by taking into account the
positional nature of the issues associated with environmental protection.
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Appendix
Table 2: Manifestos used in the qualitative analysis.
Reference Document title
BNP 2005 Rebuilding British democracy
BNP 2010 Democracy, freedom, culture and identity
DF 2009 Arbejdsprogram
FN 2007 Programme de gouvernement
FN 2009 ‘Leur’ Europe n’est pas la notre! Voila l’Europe que nous
voulons
FPO¨ 2006 Wahlprogramm
FPO¨ 2008 O¨sterreich im Wort
FPO¨ 2009 Echte Volksvertreter stat EU-Verrater
LAOS 2007 Plaisio theseon
LN 2008 Le idee della Lega
LN 2009 Proposte e obiettivi
NPD 2009 Deutschlands starke Rechte
PVV 2010 De agenda van hoop en optimisme
REP 2002 Sozial-patriotisch-o¨kologish
SD 2011 Sverigedemokratiskt principprogram 2011
SVP 2011 Unser parteiprogramm 2011–2015
TF 2011 Suomalaiselle sopivin
VB 2009 Dit is ons land
VB 2012 Het programma van het Vlaams Belang
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